Cryptographically secured multi-candidate election system using a treshold version of Paillier Cryptosystem and Zero-Knowledge proofs.
This is an implementation of the paper published in PODC '01: « Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing », August 2001, pages 274–283, available on the ACM Digital Library.
This project uses cmake for the build and the boost library for its multiprecision and random modules.
On a Debian-based system you can install them with:
$ sudo apt-get install cmake libboost-all-dev
Complete the configuration file before running the simulation.
$ cmake CMakeLists.txt
$ make- Classic execution of the election system simulation :
$ ./EVote- Verbose mode on some fraudulent votes (we do not recommand using the
--verboseon a heavy configuration) :
$ ./EVote --verbose --votesAfter a few runs of the simulation with different configurations on the same processor, we reached the limit of our implementation at 400,000 voters for 128 bits keys. Below are time metrics taken on the different phases of the execution.
| Simulation phase | Measured time |
|---|---|
| Generation of 200 keys | 9'03s |
| Encryption of 225,000 votes | 7'25s |
| Zero-Knowledge Proof verifications | 1'52s |
| Treshold decryption | < 1s |
- Add a keys serialization
- Legal vote proof (Zero-knowledge proof 2, § 10.3.2)
- Partial decryption proof (§ 10.2.1)
- Vérification des preuves : t+1 bons déchiffrement nécessaires à la combinaison
- Receipt-free property (§ 10.5)
- The commitments can be replaced by their hash values (§ 6)