Skip to content
New issue

Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.

By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.

Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account

suggestion : flag for silent erase of wallet #632

Open
jpph opened this issue Mar 15, 2024 · 4 comments
Open

suggestion : flag for silent erase of wallet #632

jpph opened this issue Mar 15, 2024 · 4 comments

Comments

@jpph
Copy link

jpph commented Mar 15, 2024

Keystone wallet can record up to 3 wallet, and the number of registered wallet is discoverable by trying to add new wallet. So for attacker with some knowledge he can know if we have hidden wallet or not. Would be nice when we setup a wallet we can set 1 non erasable wallet and 2 erasable wallet. These 2 will be silently erased when user add new wallet.
This is just an idea , maybe there is other solution, it might do more bad than good...

@ww3512687
Copy link
Contributor

ww3512687 commented Mar 16, 2024

Thank you for this suggestion,Hiding the entrance to add a wallet could be very polarizing and we'll consider design options for that. @jpph

@AtomicRPM
Copy link

Keystone wallet can record up to 3 wallet, and the number of registered wallet is discoverable by trying to add new wallet. So for attacker with some knowledge he can know if we have hidden wallet or not. Would be nice when we setup a wallet we can set 1 non erasable wallet and 2 erasable wallet. These 2 will be silently erased when user add new wallet. This is just an idea , maybe there is other solution, it might do more bad than good...

If all three address spaces are in use an attacker would only know that the address space in the device is full, and the firmware will block any further account creation access. This would render the device useless to an attacker/thief since the device is pin locked. An attacker/thief's only action in this case is pin entry, which after a number of failed attempts would wipe the device.

Wallets are accessed via unique pins, and then from there the setting options are accessible. How do you suggest an attacker will be able to get past the pin block on power up to add a wallet in the first place, let alone determine that the address space inside the device is full?

@jpph
Copy link
Author

jpph commented May 18, 2024

It is to be able to give a ''decoy'' pin to gouvrnt/home jacking. But by doing so and it they try create new wallet , they will see that other slot are taken. It would be nice to have a flag to allow ''silent erasing of wallet '' so the attacker will be able to create other wallet (and overwrite existing wallet without noticing it) and think that the other slot were in fact empty.

@AtomicRPM
Copy link

AtomicRPM commented May 18, 2024

Unfortunately all your request/suggestion does is allow for a brute force of a pin. Using your scenario above, the attacker/kidnapper/thief/organized crime member who managed to use a US $5.00 wrench from Harbor Freight across your jaw to get you to divulge the pin, can now repeatedly brute force the device 4 times, then enter the decoy pin to reset the self destruct, and repeat. I would rather the firmware not introduce attack vectors.

Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment
Labels
None yet
Projects
None yet
Development

No branches or pull requests

3 participants