-
Notifications
You must be signed in to change notification settings - Fork 0
New issue
Have a question about this project? Sign up for a free GitHub account to open an issue and contact its maintainers and the community.
By clicking “Sign up for GitHub”, you agree to our terms of service and privacy statement. We’ll occasionally send you account related emails.
Already on GitHub? Sign in to your account
A clean proposal for redeeming group tokens #34
Comments
I would disagree here. If every group token either needs one personal token or another group token as collateral than the total amount of circulating (not used as collateral) tokens is still equal to the amount of personal tokens. However - if a group is malicious - the way it can inflate its supply is to create a million fake personal account and trust all of them and use the personal tokens as collateral. However - if the process of adding members has strong guarantees then also the group token has those strong guarantees. |
I want to retract the above argument that we must burn group circles if they are used as collateral, because it does create problems to eventually always be able to redeem for personal Circles. Perhaps what we can instead do for group circles as collateral is: subtract from the total supply of the group being staked, and add to the group it is being staked into. Then the total collateral is not manipulable with repeatedly restaking group circles (as no nett total supply is being created). Upon redeeming the collateral of the group, we do the reverse: reduce total supply of group it is being redeemed from, and up the total supply again of the group it was originally from. |
this is programmable in the new architecture but consider the total supply issue in 1155 |
proposal: group tokens can be redeemed for the amount of your personal tokens present in the collateral, paying a relative exit fee
note: while it's technically possible to "have you choose which collateral tokens you'd want upon redeeming group tokens", there are several reasons why we might not want to allow that.
First, upon minting you have to declare which of your (avatar/group) circles you want to deposit as collateral to mint new group tokens. The group needs to trust these tokens, but you also need to be in possession of them. For redeeming different incentives play: there is always the incentive to redeem the most-valuable-person circles from the group, creating a race to redeem the collateral; especially if I might have (poorly-connected / less-valuable) personal circles, that are still trusted by the group. This can be blocked by having high exit fees from the group, but that's an unfortunate way to mitigate the problem.
the two extremal approaches, burn-collateral-so-no-redemption or choose-your-redemption-freely:
exit fee
for the group v2 to 100%, the group will burn the collateral upon minting. This is also necessary to accept group tokens as trusted collateral (with native group support groups can trust other groups so group tokens can be collateral to other groups, not so in v1) - why is it necessary? one can keep increasing group collateral artificial by minting group tokens from group tokens, so they have to be burnt to be meaningful as collateral.so
3. a clean proposal that still allows exiting from a group token without sharp edge cases (at least thus far): you can only redeem group tokens for your own personal tokens. So if I have
x
group circles, and the collateral hasy
of my personal circles, then I can redeem a maximum ofmin(x, y)
group circles for my own personal circles. Doesn't matter who deposited my personal circles.tl;dr
The combined implementation is then summarised with a single
exit fee
:My guess is that the exit fee 100%, will be the most powerful option for groups, but it does not hurt to leave the developer field open for other experiments
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: