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References.bib
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@article{PennycookRand2017b,
abstract = {Empiric evidence that fact-checking of fake news done by `FB is not working. What are effective techniques for combating belief in fake news? Tagging fake articles with " Disputed by 3 rd party fact-checkers " warnings and making articles' sources more salient by adding publisher logos are two approaches that have received large-scale rollouts on social media in recent months. Here we assess the effect of these interventions on perceptions of accuracy across seven experiments (total N=7,534). With respect to disputed warnings, we find that tagging articles as disputed did significantly reduce their perceived accuracy relative to a control without tags, but only modestly (d=.20, 3.7 percentage point decrease in headlines judged as accurate). Furthermore, we find a backfire effect – particularly among Trump supporters and those under 26 years of age – whereby untagged fake news stories are seen as more accurate than in the control. We also find a similar spillover effect for real news, whose perceived accuracy is increased by the presence of disputed tags on other headlines. With respect to source salience, we find no evidence that adding a banner with the logo of the headline's publisher had any impact on accuracy judgments whatsoever. Together, these results suggest that the currently deployed approaches are not nearly enough to effectively undermine belief in fake news, and new (empirically supported) strategies are needed.},
author = {Pennycook, Gordon and Rand, David G},
keywords = {fact-checking,fake news,misinformation,news media,social media,source},
pages = {1--51},
title = {{Assessing the effect of "disputed" warnings and source salience on perceptions of fake news accuracy}},
year = {2017}
}
@article{Blairetal2019,
abstract = {Researchers need to select high-quality research designs and communicate those designs clearly to readers. Both tasks are difficult. We provide a framework for formally declaring the analytically relevant features of a research design in a demonstrably complete manner, with applications to qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods research. The approach to design declaration we describe requires defining a model of the world (M), an inquiry (I), a data strategy (D), and an answer strategy (A). Declaration of these features in code provides sufficient information for researchers and readers to use Monte Carlo techniques to diagnose properties such as power, bias, accuracy of qualitative causal inferences, and other diagnosands. Ex ante declarations can be used to improve designs and facilitate preregistration, analysis, and reconciliation of intended and actual analyses. Ex post declarations are useful for describing, sharing, reanalyzing, and critiquing existing designs. We provide open-source software, DeclareDesign, to implement the proposed approach.},
author = {Blair, Graeme and Cooper, Jasper and Coppock, Alexander and Humphreys, Macartan},
doi = {10.1017/S0003055419000194},
issn = {15375943},
journal = {American Political Science Review},
number = {3},
pages = {838--859},
title = {{Declaring and diagnosing research designs}},
volume = {113},
year = {2019}
}
@incollection{AalbergCurran2012,
address = {New York, NY},
author = {Aalberg, Toril and Curran, James},
booktitle = {How Media Inform Democracy: A Comparative Approach},
pages = {3--15},
publisher = {Routledge},
title = {{How Media Inform Democracy: Central Debates}},
year = {2012}
}
@article{Sundar1998,
abstract = {Are quoted sources in online news as psychologically meaningful as those in printed and broadcast news? A within-subjects experiment was designed to answer this question. On a web site, forty-eight subjects read three online news stories with quotes and three stories without source attribution. They rated stories with quotes significantly higher in credibility and quality than identical stories without quotes. However, quotes did not seem to affect their ratings of liking for - and representativeness (newsworthiness) of - online news.},
author = {Sundar, S Shyam},
doi = {10.1177/107769909807500108},
isbn = {10776990},
issn = {1077-6990},
journal = {Journalism {\&} Mass Communication Quarterly},
keywords = {Experiment,Quotes,Source credibility},
mendeley-tags = {Experiment,Quotes,Source credibility},
number = {1},
pages = {55--68},
pmid = {807036},
title = {{Effect of Source Attribution on Perception of Online News Stories}},
volume = {75},
year = {1998}
}
@article{Arendtetal2019,
author = {Arendt, Florian and Haim, Mario and Beck, Julia},
doi = {10.1007/s11616-019-00484-4},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Arendt et al. (2019).pdf:pdf},
issn = {0033-4006},
journal = {Publizistik},
number = {2},
pages = {181--204},
title = {{Fake News, Warnhinweise und perzipierter Wahrheitsgehalt: Zur unterschiedlichen Anf{\"{a}}lligkeit f{\"{u}}r Falschmeldungen in Abh{\"{a}}ngigkeit von der politischen OrientierungFake news, warning messages, and perceived truth value: investigating the differential suscept}},
volume = {64},
year = {2019}
}
@article{VragaBode2017,
abstract = {Social media are often criticized as serving as a source of misinformation, but in this study we examine how they may also function to correct misperceptions on an emerging health issue. We use an experimental design to consider social correction that occurs via peers, testing both the type of correction (i.e., whether a source is provided or not) and the platform on which the correction occurs (i.e., Facebook versus Twitter). Our results suggest that a source is necessary to correct misperceptions about the causes of the Zika virus on both Facebook and Twitter, but the mechanism by which such correction occurs differs across platforms. Implications for successful social media campaigns to address health misinformation are addressed.},
author = {Vraga, Emily K. and Bode, Leticia},
doi = {10.1080/1369118X.2017.1313883},
issn = {1369-118X},
journal = {Information, Communication {\&} Society},
pages = {1--17},
title = {{I do not believe you: how providing a source corrects health misperceptions across social media platforms}},
year = {2017}
}
@article{Kuklinskietal2000,
abstract = {Scholars have documented the deficiencies in political knowledge among American citizens. An- other problem, misinformation, has received less attention. People are misinformed when they con- fidently hold wrong beliefs. We present evidence of misinformation about welfare and show that this misinformation acts as an obstacle to educating the public with correct facts. Moreover, wide- spread misinformation can lead to collective preferences that are far different from those that would exist if people were correctly informed. The misinformation phenomenon has implications for two currently influential scholarly literatures: the study of political heuristics and the study of elite per- suasion and issue framing.},
author = {Kuklinski, James H. and Quirk, Paul J. and Jerit, Jennifer and Schwieder, David and Rich, Robert F.},
doi = {10.1111/0022-3816.00033},
journal = {Journal of Politics},
keywords = {Beliefs,Misbeliefs,Misinformation,Preferences,Survey experiment},
mendeley-tags = {Beliefs,Misbeliefs,Misinformation,Preferences,Survey experiment},
number = {3},
pages = {790--816},
title = {{Misinformation and the Currency of Democratic Citizenship}},
volume = {62},
year = {2000}
}
@article{Roush2019,
author = {Roush, Carolyn E},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Roush {\&} Sood (2019).pdf:pdf},
title = {{A Gap in Our Understanding ? Reconsidering the Evidence for Partisan Knowledge Gaps}},
year = {2019}
}
@inproceedings{Gabielkovetal2016,
author = {Gabielkov, Maksym and Ramachandran, Arthi and Chaintreau, Augustin},
booktitle = {ACM SIGMETRICS/IFIP Performance 2016},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Gabielkov et al. - 2016 - Social Clicks What and Who Gets Read on Twitter.pdf:pdf},
isbn = {9781450342667},
series = {ACM SIGMETRICS / IFIP Performance 2016},
title = {{Social Clicks: What and Who Gets Read on Twitter?}},
year = {2016}
}
@techreport{Pew2017,
author = {{Pew Research Center}},
institution = {Pew Research Center},
title = {{News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2017}},
year = {2017}
}
@article{Bisgaard2019,
abstract = {Scholars often evaluate citizens' democratic competence by focusing on their ability to get relevant facts right. In this article, I show why this approach can yield misleading conclusions about citizen competence. I argue that although citizens with strong partisan loyalties might be forced to accept the same facts, they find alternative ways to rationalize reality. One such way, I show, is through the selective attribution of credit and blame. With four randomized experiments, conducted in diverse national settings and containing closed‐ as well as open‐ended questions, I find that as partisans correctly updated economic beliefs to reflect new facts, they conversely attributed responsibility in a highly selective fashion. Although partisans might acknowledge the same facts, they are apt in seizing on and producing attributional arguments that fit their preferred worldviews.},
author = {Bisgaard, Martin},
doi = {10.1111/ajps.12432},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Bisgaard (2019).pdf:pdf},
issn = {15405907},
journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
number = {0},
pages = {1--17},
title = {{How Getting the Facts Right Can Fuel Partisan-Motivated Reasoning}},
volume = {00},
year = {2019}
}
@article{Horne2019,
author = {Horne, Zachary and Duran, Nicholas},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Solanki2019.pdf:pdf},
number = {May},
title = {{No Title}},
year = {2019}
}
@article{Burkhardt2017,
author = {Burkhardt, Joanna M.},
journal = {Library Technology Reports},
number = {8},
pages = {5--9},
title = {{History of Fake News}},
volume = {53},
year = {2017}
}
@article{Guilbeaultetal2018,
abstract = {Scientific communications about climate change are frequently misinterpreted due to motivated reasoning, which leads some people to misconstrue climate data in ways that conflict with the intended message of climate scientists. Attempts to reduce partisan bias through bipartisan communication networks have found that exposure to diverse political views can exacerbate bias. Here, we find that belief exchange in structured bipartisan networks can significantly improve the ability of both conservatives and liberals to interpret climate data, eliminating belief polarization. We also find that social learning can be reduced, and polarization maintained, when the salience of partisanship is increased, either through exposure to the logos of political parties or through exposure to political identity markers.Vital scientific communications are frequently misinterpreted by the lay public as a result of motivated reasoning, where people misconstrue data to fit their political and psychological biases. In the case of climate change, some people have been found to systematically misinterpret climate data in ways that conflict with the intended message of climate scientists. While prior studies have attempted to reduce motivated reasoning through bipartisan communication networks, these networks have also been found to exacerbate bias. Popular theories hold that bipartisan networks amplify bias by exposing people to opposing beliefs. These theories are in tension with collective intelligence research, which shows that exchanging beliefs in social networks can facilitate social learning, thereby improving individual and group judgments. However, prior experiments in collective intelligence have relied almost exclusively on neutral questions that do not engage motivated reasoning. Using Amazon's Mechanical Turk, we conducted an online experiment to test how bipartisan social networks can influence subjects' interpretation of climate communications from NASA. Here, we show that exposure to opposing beliefs in structured bipartisan social networks substantially improved the accuracy of judgments among both conservatives and liberals, eliminating belief polarization. However, we also find that social learning can be reduced, and belief polarization maintained, as a result of partisan priming. We find that increasing the salience of partisanship during communication, both through exposure to the logos of political parties and through exposure to the political identities of network peers, can significantly reduce social learning.},
author = {Guilbeault, Douglas and Becker, Joshua and Centola, Damon},
doi = {10.1073/pnas.1722664115},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Guilbeault et al (2018).pdf:pdf},
issn = {0027-8424},
journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences},
number = {39},
pages = {9714--9719},
title = {{Social learning and partisan bias in the interpretation of climate trends}},
volume = {115},
year = {2018}
}
@article{Gerhart2017,
author = {Torres, Russell and Gerhart, Natalie and Negahban, Arash},
journal = {Twenty-third Americas Conference on Information Systems, Boston},
title = {{Combatting Fake News : An Investigation of Individuals ' Information Verification Behaviors on Social Networking Sites}},
year = {2017}
}
@unpublished{BauerClemm2019,
author = {Bauer, Paul C. and {Clemm von Hohenberg}, Bernhard},
title = {{Building Trust in Fake News: An Experiment}},
year = {2019}
}
@article{Unkelbach2009,
abstract = {The subjective impression that statements are true increases when statements are presented repeatedly. There are two sources for this truth effect: An increase in validity based on recollection (a controlled process) and increase in processing fluency due to repeated exposure (an automatic process). Using multinomial processing trees (MPT), we present a comprehensive model of the truth effect. Furthermore, we show that whilst the increase in processing fluency is indeed automatic, the interpretation and use of that experience is not. Experiment 1 demonstrates the standard use of the fluency experience and Experiment 2 demonstrates that people can change the interpretation of the experience according to its ecological validity. By implication, the truth effect represents the adaptive usage of feedback received from internal processes. {\textcopyright} 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.},
author = {Unkelbach, Christian and Stahl, Christoph},
doi = {10.1016/j.concog.2008.09.006},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/UnkelbachStahl2009.pdf:pdf},
issn = {10538100},
journal = {Consciousness and Cognition},
keywords = {Cue learning,Process-dissociation,Processing fluency,Truth judgments},
number = {1},
pages = {22--38},
publisher = {Elsevier Inc.},
title = {{A multinomial modeling approach to dissociate different components of the truth effect}},
volume = {18},
year = {2009}
}
@article{Dholakia1977,
author = {Dholakia, Ruby Roy and Sternthal, Brian},
journal = {Journal of Consumer Research},
number = {4},
pages = {223--232},
title = {{Highly Credible Sources: Persuasive Facilitators or Persuasive Liabilities?}},
volume = {3},
year = {1977}
}
@unpublished{Woolley2017,
author = {Woolley, Samuel C and Howard, Philip N},
title = {{Computational Propaganda Worldwide: Executive Summary}},
year = {2017}
}
@article{BarabasJerit2009,
author = {Barabas, Jason and Jerit, Jennifer},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Barabas {\&} Jerrit (2009).pdf:pdf},
journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
number = {1},
pages = {73--89},
title = {{Estimating the Causal Effects of Media Coverage on Policy-Specific Knowledge}},
volume = {53},
year = {2009}
}
@article{Bolsenetal2014,
abstract = {Political parties play a vital role in democracies by linking citizens to their representatives. Nonetheless, a longstanding concern is that partisan identification slants decision-making. Citizens may support (oppose) policies that they would otherwise oppose (support) in the absence of an endorsement from a political party—this is due in large part to what is called partisan motivated reasoning where individuals interpret information through the lens of their party commitment. We explore partisan motivated reasoning in a survey experiment focusing on support for an energy law. We identify two politically relevant factors that condition partisan motivated reasoning: (1) an explicit inducement to form an “accurate” opinion, and (2) cross-partisan, but not consensus, bipartisan support for the law. We further provide evidence of how partisan motivated reasoning works psychologically and affects opinion strength. We conclude by discussing the implications of our results for understanding opinion formation and the overall quality of citizens' opinions.},
author = {Bolsen, Toby and Druckman, James N. and Cook, Fay Lomax},
doi = {10.1007/s11109-013-9238-0},
eprint = {arXiv:1011.1669v3},
isbn = {0190-9320},
issn = {01909320},
journal = {Political Behavior},
keywords = {Experiment,Information,Motivated reasoning,Opinions,Parties,Partisan trust,Partisanship},
mendeley-tags = {Experiment,Information,Motivated reasoning,Opinions,Partisanship},
number = {2},
pages = {235--262},
pmid = {25246403},
title = {{The Influence of Partisan Motivated Reasoning on Public Opinion}},
volume = {36},
year = {2014}
}
@unpublished{SurmaOliver2018,
author = {Surma, Katherine and Oliver, Eric},
title = {{Believe It or Not? Credulity, Skepticism, and Misinformation in the American Public}},
year = {2018}
}
@article{ChiaChang2017,
abstract = {The interplay between news coverage of preelection polls and voters' assessments of bias has been well documented. Less known, but theoretically more important, is how it may play out in a media context that highly parallels political camps. The 2012 Taiwanese presidential election provides an ideal case to observe how voters' perception of hostile poll coverage might be affected by media partisanship in election campaigns. Against this backdrop, we first confirmed that voters reported greater perceptions of hostile bias when seeing disagreeable poll results. The polarized and divided media setting further shaped voters' reactions to poll coverage. Voters saw greater hostile poll bias in out-group media than in in-group media. Consequences of such perceived hostility, however, appeared inconsistent and mixed. {\textcopyright} The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The World Association for Public Opinion Research. All rights reserved.},
author = {Chia, Stella C. and Chang, Tsan Kuo},
doi = {10.1093/ijpor/edv046},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Chia {\&} Chang (2017).pdf:pdf},
issn = {14716909},
journal = {International Journal of Public Opinion Research},
number = {1},
pages = {23--45},
title = {{Not my horse: Voter preferences, media sources, and hostile poll reports in election campaigns}},
volume = {29},
year = {2017}
}
@unpublished{Neudert2017,
author = {Neudert, Lisa-Maria N.},
pages = {1--31},
title = {{Computational Propaganda in Germany: A Cautionary Tale}},
year = {2017}
}
@article{Hameleers,
author = {Hameleers, Michael and van der Meer, Toni G. L. A.},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Hameleers {\&} van den Meer (2019).pdf:pdf},
journal = {Communication Research},
title = {{Misinformation and Polarization in a High-Choice Media Environment: How Effective Are Political Fact-Checkers?}}
}
@article{Oakhill1985,
author = {Oakhill, J. V. and Johnson-Laird, P. N.},
doi = {10.1080/14640748508400919},
journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology},
keywords = {Beliefs,Experiment,Syllogistic Reasoning},
mendeley-tags = {Beliefs,Experiment,Syllogistic Reasoning},
number = {4},
pages = {553--569},
title = {{The effects of belief on the spontaneous production of syllogistic conclusions}},
volume = {37},
year = {1985}
}
@article{Valloneetal1985,
abstract = {68 pro-Israeli, 27 pro-Arab, and 49 politically neutral undergraduates viewed identical samples of major network TV coverage of the Beirut massacre and rated them as being biased against their side. Results indicate that the hostile media phenomenon appears to involve the operation of 2 separate mechanisms. Ss evaluated the fairness of the media's sample of facts and arguments differently, in light of their own divergent views about the objective merits of each side's case and their corresponding views about the nature of unbiased coverage. Ss also reported different perceptions and recollections about the program content itself; that is, each group reported more negative references to their side than positive ones, and each predicted that the coverage would sway nonpartisans in a hostile direction. Within both partisan groups, furthermore, greater knowledge of the crisis was associated with stronger perceptions of media bias. It is concluded that charges of media bias may reflect more than self-serving attempts to secure preferential treatment. They may result from the operation of basic cognitive and perceptual mechanisms that should prove relevant to perceptions of fairness or objectivity in a wide range of mediation and negotiation contexts. (11 ref)},
author = {Vallone, Robert P. and Ross, Lee and Lepper, Mark R.},
doi = {10.1037/0022-3514.49.3.577},
eprint = {arXiv:1011.1669v3},
isbn = {0022-3514 1939-1315},
issn = {00223514},
journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
number = {3},
pages = {577--585},
pmid = {4045697},
title = {{The Hostile Media Phenomenon. Biased Perception and Perceptions of Media Bias in Coverage of the Beirut Massacre}},
volume = {49},
year = {1985}
}
@book{Lazarsfeldetal1944,
address = {New York, NY},
author = {Lazarsfeld, Paul F. and Berelson, Bernard and Gaudet, Hazel},
publisher = {Duell, Sloan and Pearce},
title = {{The People's Choice}},
year = {1944}
}
@article{Berghel2017,
abstract = {Hal Berghel, "Lies, Damn Lies, and Fake News", Computer, vol. 50, no. , pp. 80-85, Feb. 2017, doi:10.1109/MC.2017.56
},
author = {Berghel, Hal},
doi = {10.1109/MC.2017.56},
issn = {00189162},
journal = {Computer},
number = {2},
title = {{Lies, Damn lies, and fake news}},
volume = {50},
year = {2017}
}
@article{Redlawsk2010,
abstract = {In order to update candidate evaluations voters must acquire information and determine whether that new information supports or opposes their candidate expectations. Normatively, new negative information about a preferred candidate should result in a downward adjustment of an existing evaluation. However, recent studies show exactly the opposite; voters become more supportive of a preferred candidate in the face of negatively valenced information. Motivated reasoning is advanced as the explanation, arguing that people are psychologically motivated to maintain and support existing evaluations. Yet it seems unlikely that voters do this ad infinitum. To do so would suggest continued motivated reasoning even in the face of extensive disconfirming information. In this study we consider whether motivated reasoning processes can be overcome simply by continuing to encounter information incongruent with expectations. If so, voters must reach a tipping point after which they begin more accurately updating their evaluations. We show experimental evidence that such an affective tipping point does in fact exist. We also show that as this tipping point is reached, anxiety increases, suggesting that the mechanism that generates the tipping point and leads to more accurate updating may be related to the theory of affective intelligence. The existence of a tipping point suggests that voters are not immune to disconfirming information after all, even when initially acting as motivated reasoners.},
author = {Redlawsk, David P. and Civettini, Andrew J W and Emmerson, Karen M.},
doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00772.x},
isbn = {1467-9221},
issn = {0162895X},
journal = {Political Psychology},
keywords = {Affective intelligence,Candidate evaluation,Motivated reasoning,Process-tracing,Voting},
number = {4},
pages = {563--593},
pmid = {16417727},
title = {{The Affective Tipping Point: Do Motivated Reasoners Ever "Get It"?}},
volume = {31},
year = {2010}
}
@article{JohnsonScileppi1969,
abstract = {In a 2 2 2 design, 25 male high school students in each of 10 groups received from a high or low credibility source a communication that was either plausible or implausible, and that was given under high- or low-ego-involvement conditions. Results indicated greater attitude change in low-ego-involvement-high-source-credibility conditions than in the other 3 combinations of source credibility and ego involvement. These latter 3 combinations did not differ significantly from each other. Results supported the theory that source credibility is a "set" influencing communication acceptance-rejection primarily under low-ego-involvement conditions. Extension of the theory to social conformity experiments is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)},
author = {Johnson, Homer H. and Scileppi, John A.},
doi = {10.1037/h0027992},
isbn = {0022-3514},
issn = {0022-3514},
journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
number = {1},
pages = {31--36},
pmid = {5352373},
title = {{Effects of Ego-Involvement Conditions on Attitude Change to High and Low Credibility Communicators}},
volume = {13},
year = {1969}
}
@article{GarrettWeeks2017,
author = {Garrett, R Kelly and Weeks, Brian E.},
doi = {10.7910/DVN/CRUW0P},
isbn = {1111111111},
issn = {1932-6203},
pages = {1--17},
title = {{Epistemic beliefs' role in promoting misperceptions and conspiracist ideation}},
year = {2017}
}
@article{SlomanRabb2019,
abstract = {Recent political events around the world, including the apparently sudden rise of populism and decline of democratic zeal, have surprised many of us and offered a window onto how people form beliefs and attitudes about the wider world. Cognitive scientists have tended to view belief and attitude formation from one of three perspectives: as a process of deliberative reasoning, as a gut reaction modulated by feelings, or as a cultural phenomenon grounded in partisan relationships. This special issue on the cognitive science of political thought brings a variety of voices to bear on the issue. The upshot is that each perspective captures part of the dynamics of opinion change, but the underlying processes operate in an integrated way. Individuals' affective reactions are conditioned by the social world, and therefore reflect their community norms. They often precede processes of reasoning, but not always. In turn, reasoning is generally motivated in the service of transmitting beliefs acquired from citizens' communities of belief. Cognition is largely a filter for attending to and sharing community norms.},
author = {Sloman, Steven A. and Rabb, Nathaniel},
doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2019.02.014},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Sloman {\&} Rabb (2019).pdf:pdf},
issn = {18737838},
journal = {Cognition},
keywords = {Attitude formation,Belief formation,Political psychology},
publisher = {Elsevier},
title = {{Thought as a determinant of political opinion}},
year = {2019}
}
@article{Redlawsk2002,
abstract = {Researchers attempting to understand how citizens process political information have advanced motivated reasoning to explain the joint role of affect and cognition. The prominence of affect suggests that all social information processing is affectively charged and prone to biases. This article makes use of a unique data set collected using a dynamic information board experiment to test important effects of motivated reasoning. In particular, affective biases should cause citizens to take longer processing information incongruent with their existing affect and such biases should also direct search for new information about candidates. Somewhat perversely, motivated reasoners may actually increase their support of a positively evaluated candidate upon learning new negatively evaluated information. Findings are reported that support all of these expectations. Additional analysis shows that these affective biases may easily lead to lower quality decision making, leading to a direct challenge to the notion of voters as rational Bayesian updaters.},
author = {Redlawsk, David P.},
doi = {10.1111/1468-2508.00161},
isbn = {0022-3816},
issn = {0022-3816},
journal = {The Journal of Politics},
number = {4},
pages = {1021--1044},
title = {{Hot Cognition or Cool Consideration? Testing the Effects of Motivated Reasoning on Political Decision Making}},
volume = {64},
year = {2002}
}
@misc{Gallup2016,
address = {Washington, D.C.},
author = {Swift, Art},
booktitle = {Gallup},
title = {{Americans' Trust in Mass Media Sinks to New Low}},
url = {https://news.gallup.com/poll/195542/americans-trust-mass-media-sinks-new-low.aspx},
urldate = {2018-09-30},
year = {2016}
}
@misc{Schmehl2017,
author = {Schmehl, Karsten},
booktitle = {Buzzfeed},
month = {jul},
title = {{7 der 10 erfolgreichsten Artikel {\"{u}}ber Angela Merkel auf Facebook sind Fake News}},
url = {https://www.buzzfeed.com/karstenschmehl/die-top-fake-news-ueber-angela-merkel?utm{\_}term=.drPqq3Qp7r{\#}.wqQ33M0nLy},
year = {2017}
}
@book{Bennett2016,
address = {Chicago},
author = {Bennett, W. Lance},
editor = {10th},
publisher = {University of Chicago Press},
title = {{News: The Politics of Illusion}},
year = {2016}
}
@article{Barberaetal2015b,
abstract = {We estimated ideological preferences of 3.8 million Twitter users and, using a data set of nearly 150 million tweets concerning 12 political and nonpolitical issues, explored whether online communication resembles an “echo chamber” (as a result of selective exposure and ideological segregation) or a “national conversation.” We observed that information was exchanged primarily among individuals with similar ideological preferences in the case of political issues (e.g., 2012 presidential election, 2013 government shutdown) but not many other current events (e.g., 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, 2014 Super Bowl). Discussion of the Newtown shootings in 2012 reflected a dynamic process, beginning as a national conversation before transforming into a polarized exchange. With respect to both political and nonpolitical issues, liberals were more likely than conservatives to engage in cross-ideological dissemination; this is an important asymmetry with respect to the structure of communication that is consistent with psychological theory and research bearing on ideological differences in epistemic, existential, and relational motivation. Overall, we conclude that previous work may have overestimated the degree of ideological segregation in social-media usage.},
author = {Barber{\'{a}}, Pablo and Jost, John T. and Nagler, Jonathan and Tucker, Joshua A. and Bonneau, Richard},
doi = {10.1177/0956797615594620},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Barberaetal2015.pdf:pdf},
issn = {14679280},
journal = {Psychological Science},
keywords = {open data,open materials,polarization,political ideology,social media},
number = {10},
pages = {1531--1542},
pmid = {26297377},
title = {{Tweeting From Left to Right: Is Online Political Communication More Than an Echo Chamber?}},
volume = {26},
year = {2015}
}
@article{Berinsky2017a,
abstract = {This article explores belief in political rumors surrounding the health care reforms enacted by Congress in 2010. Refuting rumors with statements from unlikely sources can, under certain circumstances, increase the willingness of citizens to reject rumors regardless of their own political predilections. Such source credibility effects, while well known in the political persuasion literature, have not been applied to the study of rumor. Though source credibility appears to be an effective tool for debunking political rumors, risks remain. Drawing upon research from psychology on ‘fluency' – the ease of information recall – this article argues that rumors acquire power through familiarity. Attempting to quash rumors through direct refutation may facilitate their diffusion by increasing fluency. The empirical results find that merely repeating a rumor increases its power.},
author = {Berinsky, Adam J.},
doi = {10.1017/S0007123415000186},
issn = {0007-1234},
journal = {British Journal of Political Science},
number = {2},
pages = {241--262},
title = {{Rumors and Health Care Reform: Experiments in Political Misinformation}},
volume = {47},
year = {2017}
}
@article{Tsfati2010,
abstract = {Based on the premise that online journalism offers readers with some features that may serve as an alternative to traditional journalism, this article explores possible associations between mistrust in mainstream news media and consumption of online news. Results from a telephone survey and an online survey demonstrate that the association between mistrust of mainstream news and exposure to online news in general is negative. But whereas mainstream exposure is related to trust in media, exposure to nonmainstream sites is related to media skepticism. The findings also shed some light on the factors contributing to audience trust in online news.},
author = {Tsfati, Yariv},
doi = {10.1177/0002764210376309},
isbn = {0002764210},
issn = {0002-7642},
journal = {American Behavioral Scientist},
keywords = {2001,Media trust,Source credibility,audience trust in the,cappella,countries,fading in many developed,flickinger,in recent years,institutions of the mainstream,media has been,media skepticism,online news exposure,see bennet,selective exposure,staci,trust-in-media},
mendeley-tags = {Media trust,Source credibility},
number = {1},
pages = {22--42},
title = {{Online News Exposure and Trust in the Mainstream Media: Exploring Possible Associations}},
volume = {54},
year = {2010}
}
@article{Sternthaletal1978,
abstract = {Two experiments are reported identifying the circumstances in which high credibility either facilitates, inhibits, or has no effect on the communicator's persuasiveness in relation to a less credible source. These data provide support for the cognitive response view of information processing and suggest the importance of message recipient's initial opinion as a determinant of persuasion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]},
author = {Sternthal, Brian and Dholakia, Ruby and Leavitt, Clark},
doi = {10.1086/208704},
isbn = {00935301},
issn = {0093-5301},
journal = {Journal of Consumer Research},
pages = {252--260},
pmid = {10297222},
title = {{The Persuasive Effect of Source Credibility: Tests of Cognitive Response}},
volume = {4},
year = {1978}
}
@article{Kruikemeieretal2018,
author = {Kruikemeier, Sanne and Lecheler, Sophie and Boyer, Ming M.},
doi = {10.1080/10584609.2017.1388310},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Downloads/Kruikemeier et al. (2018).pdf:pdf},
journal = {Political Communication},
number = {1},
pages = {75--96},
title = {{Learning From News on Different Media Platforms: An Eye-Tracking Experiment}},
volume = {35},
year = {2018}
}
@article{Stroud2008,
abstract = {Today, people have ample opportunity to engage in selective exposure, the selection of information matching their beliefs. Whether this is occurring, however, is a matter of debate. While some worry that people increasingly are seeking out likeminded views, others propose that newer media provide an increased opportunity for exposure to diverse views. In returning to the concept of selective exposure, this article argues that certain topics, such as politics, are more likely to inspire selective exposure and that research should investigate habitual media exposure patterns, as opposed to single exposure decisions. This study investigates whether different media types (newspapers, political talk radio, cable news, and Internet) are more likely to inspire selective exposure. Using data from the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey, evidence supports the idea that people's political beliefs are related to their media exposure-a pattern that persists across media types. Over-time analyses suggest that people's political beliefs motivate their media use patterns and that cable news audiences became increasingly politically divided over the course of the 2004 election. {\textcopyright} 2007 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.},
author = {Stroud, Natalie Jomini},
doi = {10.1007/s11109-007-9050-9},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Stroud (2008).pdf:pdf},
issn = {01909320},
journal = {Political Behavior},
keywords = {2004 election,Media,Partisanship,Political ideology,Presidential politics,Selective exposure},
number = {3},
pages = {341--366},
title = {{Media use and political predispositions: Revisiting the concept of selective exposure}},
volume = {30},
year = {2008}
}
@article{Zolloetal2015,
abstract = {According to the World Economic Forum, the diffusion of unsubstantiated rumors on online social media is one of the main threats for our society. The disintermediated paradigm of content production and consumption on online social media might foster the formation of homogeneous communities (echo-chambers) around specific worldviews. Such a scenario has been shown to be a vivid environment for the diffusion of false claim. Not rarely, viral phenomena trigger naive (and funny) social responses-e.g., the recent case of Jade Helm 15 where a simple military exercise turned out to be perceived as the beginning of the civil war in the US. In this work, we address the emotional dynamics of collective debates around distinct kinds of information-i.e., science and conspiracy news-and inside and across their respective polarized communities. We find that for both kinds of content the longer the discussion the more the negativity of the sentiment. We show that comments on conspiracy posts tend to be more negative than on science posts. However, the more the engagement of users, the more they tend to negative commenting (both on science and conspiracy). Finally, zooming in at the interaction among polarized communities, we find a general negative pattern. As the number of comments increases-i.e., the discussion becomes longer-the sentiment of the post is more and more negative.},
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
arxivId = {arXiv:1505.08001v1},
author = {Zollo, Fabiana and Novak, Petra Kralj and {Del Vicario}, Michela and Bessi, Alessandro and Mozeti{\v{c}}, Igor and Scala, Antonio and Caldarelli, Guido and Quattrociocchi, Walter and Preis, Tobias},
doi = {10.1371/journal.pone.0138740},
eprint = {arXiv:1505.08001v1},
isbn = {10.1371/journal.pone.0138740},
issn = {19326203},
journal = {PLoS ONE},
keywords = {API,Facebook,Fake News,Misinformation,Observational,Sentiment analysis},
mendeley-tags = {API,Facebook,Fake News,Misinformation,Observational,Sentiment analysis},
number = {9},
pages = {1--22},
pmid = {26422473},
title = {{Emotional dynamics in the age of misinformation}},
volume = {10},
year = {2015}
}
@article{Unkelbach2017,
abstract = {People are more likely to judge repeated statements as true compared to new statements, a phenomenon known as the illusory truth effect. The currently dominant explanation is an increase in processing fluency caused by prior presentation. We present a new theory to explain this effect. We assume that people judge truth based on coherent references for statements in memory. Due to prior presentation, repeated statements have more coherently linked references; thus, a repetition-induced truth effect follows. Five experiments test this theory. Experiment 1–3 show that both the amount and the coherence of references for a repeated statement influence judged truth. Experiment 4 shows that people also judge new statements more likely “true” when they share references with previously presented statements. Experiment 5 realizes theoretically predicted conditions under which repetition should not influence judged truth. Based on these data, we discuss how the theory relates to other explanations of repetition-induced truth and how it may integrate other truth-related phenomena and belief biases.},
author = {Unkelbach, Christian and Rom, Sarah C.},
doi = {10.1016/j.cognition.2016.12.016},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/UnkelbachRom2017.pdf:pdf},
issn = {18737838},
journal = {Cognition},
keywords = {Familiarity,Fluency,Illusory truth effect,Referential theory},
pages = {110--126},
publisher = {Elsevier B.V.},
title = {{A referential theory of the repetition-induced truth effect}},
volume = {160},
year = {2017}
}
@article{EaglyChaiken1975,
abstract = {This study tested the attribution hypothesis that message persuasiveness de- creases to the extent that the position the communicator advocates is expected on the basis of a characteristic he possesses. Some subjects read a message by an attractive or unattractive communicator who espoused a desirable or un- desirable position on one of two topics, while others, without reading the message, estimated the likelihood that the communicator would advocate each position. On expectancies, undesirable positions were judged more likely than desirable ones, and a Source Attractiveness X Position Desirability interaction showed attractive-desirable and unattractive-undesirable communicator-posi- tion pairings judged likelier than attractive-undesirable and unattractive-de- sirable pairings. On opinions, main effects showed attractive communicators more persuasive than unattractive communicators and desirable positions more persuasive than undesirable positions. However, a Source Attractiveness X Position Desirability interaction indicated that attractive communicators were more persuasive than unattractive ones given undesirable positions but only equally persuasive given desirable positions. The attractiveness main effect on opinions was interpreted in terms of communicator likability, while the paral- lelism between expectancies and opinions (and other responses) with regard to the other effects supported the attribution interpretation. Choice or no choice about receiving a message had only a marginal effect on opinion change.},
author = {Eagly, Alice H. and Chaiken, Shelly},
doi = {10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.01403.x},
isbn = {0146167201},
issn = {0022-3514},
journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
number = {1},
pages = {136--144},
pmid = {10751980},
title = {{An attribution analysis of the effect of communicator characteristics on opinion change: The case of communicator attractiveness}},
volume = {32},
year = {1975}
}
@article{Lazeretal2018,
abstract = {Plasma and ovarian levels of the dimeric forms of inhibin and plasma estradiol-17beta were investigated and compared with changes in plasma gonadotropins from Postnatal Day (PND) 5 to PND 30 in the female rat. The inhibin subunit proteins were localized in follicular granulosa cells of the ovary. Plasma immunoreactive inhibin levels were low until PND 15 and increased thereafter. Plasma levels of inhibin B (alpha and beta(B) subunits) remained very low until PND 15 and then increased by approximately 24-fold. In contrast, plasma levels of inhibin A (alpha and beta(A) subunits) were relatively low and steady until PND 20, then increased by approximately 3-fold at PND 25. Changes in ovarian inhibin A and B levels closely resembled those in plasma levels. Plasma FSH levels were low at PND 10 but started to peak from PND 15 and remained high until PND 20, followed by a remarkable reduction at PNDs 25 and 30. This dramatic fall in FSH coincided with the rise of inhibin A. A significant inverse correlation was observed between plasma FSH and plasma inhibin A (r = -0.67, P {\textless} 0.0002), ovarian inhibin A (r = -0.48, P {\textless} 0.01), plasma inhibin B (r = -0.48, P {\textless} 0.05), and ovarian inhibin B (r = -0.54, P {\textless} 0.01). Plasma estradiol-17beta levels were elevated from PND 5 through PND 15, then fell sharply through PND 30. Plasma estradiol-17beta was significantly and positively (r = 0.75, P {\textless} 0.0002) correlated with plasma FSH. Plasma LH rose to higher levels at PND 15 and tended to be lower thereafter. The inhibin alpha, beta(A), and beta(B) subunits were localized to primary, secondary, and antral and large antral follicles, but the types of these immunopositive follicles varied with age. It appeared that, at PND 25 and afterward, all three subunits were mainly confined to large antral follicles in the ovary. We conclude that estradiol-17beta likely is the major candidate in stimulation of FSH secretion in the infantile female rat. We also conclude that inhibin regulation of pituitary FSH secretion through its negative feedback in the infantile female rat begins to operate after PND 20. We suggest that this negative feedback is achieved by increases in plasma levels of the two dimeric forms, and that inhibin A appears to be the major physiological regulator of FSH secretion at the initiation of this mechanism. We also conclude that large antral follicles in the ovary are the primary source of these bioactive inhibins that are secreted in large amounts into the circulation after PND 20.},
author = {Lazer, David M. J. and Baum, Matthew A. and Benkler, Yochai and Berinsky, Adam J. and Greenhill, Kelly M. and Menczer, Filippo and Metzger, Miriam J. and Nyhan, Brendan and Pennycook, Gordon and Rothschild, David and Schudson, Michael and Sloman, Steven A. and Sunstein, Cass R. and Thorson, Emily A. and Watts, Duncan J. and Zittrain, Jonathan L.},
doi = {10.1126/science.aao2998},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Lazer et al. (2018).pdf:pdf},
isbn = {0006-3363 (Print)$\backslash$r0006-3363 (Linking)},
issn = {0036-8075},
journal = {Science},
number = {6380},
pages = {1094--1096},
pmid = {11717121},
title = {{The science of fake news}},
volume = {359},
year = {2018}
}
@article{MillerKrosnick2000,
author = {Miller, Joanne M and Krosnick, Jon A},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Miller {\&} Krosnick (2000).pdf:pdf},
journal = {American Journal of Political Science},
number = {2},
pages = {301--315},
title = {{News Media Impact on the Ingredients of Presidential Evaluations: Politically Knowledgeable Citizens Are Guided by a Trusted Source}},
volume = {44},
year = {2000}
}
@article{AdamicGlance2005,
author = {Adamic, Lada and Glance, Natalie},
journal = {Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on link discovery},
pages = {1--16},
title = {{The Political Blogosphere and the 2004 U.S. Election: Divided They Blog}},
year = {2005}
}
@unpublished{Pennycooketal2019b,
author = {Pennycook, Gordon and Epstein, Ziv and Mosleh, Mohsen and Arechar, Antonio A. and Eckles, Dean and Rand, David G.},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Pennycooketal2019b.pdf:pdf},
title = {{Understanding and reducing the spread of misinformation online}},
year = {2019}
}
@article{Chaiken1980,
abstract = {In Experiment 1, subjects read a persuasive message from a likable or unlikable communicator who presented six or two arguments concerning one of two topics. High response involvement subjects anticipated discussing the message topic at a future experimental session, whereas low involvement subjects anticipated dis-cussing a different topic. For high involvement subjects, opinion change was significantly greater given six arguments but was unaffected by communicator likability. For low involvement subjects, opinion change was significantly greater given a likable communicator but was unaffected by the arguments manipulation. In Experiment 2, high issue involvement subjects showed slightly greater opinion change when exposed to five arguments from an unlikable (vs. one argument from a likable) communicator, whereas low involvement subjects exhibited sig-nificantly greater persuasion in response to one argument from a likable (vs. five arguments from an unlikable) communicator. These findings support the idea that high involvement leads message recipients to employ a systematic informa-tion processing strategy in which message-based cognitions mediate persuasion, whereas low involvement leads recipients to use a heuristic processing strategy in which simple decision rules mediate persuasion. Support was also obtained for the hypothesis that content-mediated (vs. source-mediated) opinion change would shower greater persistence. This research distinguishes between a sys-According to a systematic view, recipients tematic and a heuristic view of persuasion, exert considerable cognitive effort in perform-Both conceptualizations regard message re-ing this task: They actively attempt to com-cipients as concerned with assessing the prehend and evaluate the message's arguments validity of the message's overall conclusion, as well as to assess their validity in relation to the message's conclusion. In contrast, ac-cording to a heuristic view of persuasion, re-This article is based on a dissertation submitted cipients exert comparatively little effort in in partial fulfillment of the doctoral requirements judging message validity: Rather than pro-at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst. The cessing argumentation, recipients may rely author is grateful to Alice H. Eagly and Icek Ajzen Qn (typlcally) more access ible information for their counsel and to},
author = {Chaiken, Shelly},
doi = {10.1037//0022-3514.39.5.752},
isbn = {0022-3514, 0022-3514},
issn = {00223514},
journal = {Journal of Personality and Social Psychology},
keywords = {communicator likeability {\&},number of arguments, heuristic vs systematic infor,perceived consequences {\&},position advocated {\&},topic {\&}},
number = {5},
pages = {752--766},
pmid = {10751980},
title = {{Heuristic versus systematic information processing and the use of source versus message cues in persuasion}},
volume = {39},
year = {1980}
}
@techreport{IfP2018,
address = {Mainz},
author = {{Institut f{\"{u}}r Publizistik}},
institution = {Institut für Publizistik (Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz)},
title = {{Medienvertrauen in Deutschland 2017}},
url = {http://www.uni-mainz.de/presse/aktuell/Dateien/02{\_}publizistik{\_}medienvertrauen{\_}{\_}2017{\_}grafiken.pdf},
year = {2018}
}
@article{Eadyetal2019,
abstract = {A major point of debate in the study of the Internet and politics is the extent to which social media platforms encourage citizens to inhabit online “bubbles” or “echo chambers,” exposed primarily to ideologically congenial political information. To investigate this question, we link a representative survey of Americans with data from respondents' public Twitter accounts (N = 1,496). We then quantify the ideological distributions of users' online political and media environments by merging validated estimates of user ideology with the full set of accounts followed by our survey respondents (N = 642,345) and the available tweets posted by those accounts (N {\~{}} 1.2 billion). We study the extent to which liberals and conservatives encounter counter-attitudinal messages in two distinct ways: (a) by the accounts they follow and (b) by the tweets they receive from those accounts, either directly or indirectly (via retweets). More than a third of respondents do not follow any media sources, but among those who do, we find a substantial amount of overlap (51{\%}) in the ideological distributions of accounts followed by users on opposite ends of the political spectrum. At the same time, however, we find asymmetries in individuals' willingness to venture into cross-cutting spaces, with conservatives more likely to follow media and political accounts classified as left-leaning than the reverse. Finally, we argue that such choices are likely tempered by online news watching behavior.},
author = {Eady, Gregory and Nagler, Jonathan and Guess, Andy and Zilinsky, Jan and Tucker, Joshua A},
doi = {10.1177/2158244019832705},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Eadyetal2019.pdf:pdf},
issn = {21582440},
journal = {SAGE Open},
keywords = {communication,communication technologies,mass communication,media {\&} society,media consumption,new media,political behavior,political communication,political science,social sciences},
number = {1},
title = {{How Many People Live in Political Bubbles on Social Media? Evidence From Linked Survey and Twitter Data}},
volume = {9},
year = {2019}
}
@article{Kahan2017a,
abstract = {This commentary uses the dynamic of identity-protective cognition to pose a friendly challenge to Jussim (2012). Like other forms of information processing, this one is too readily characterized as a bias. It is no mistake, however, to view identity-protective cognition as generating inaccurate perceptions. The “bounded rationality” paradigm incorrectly equates rationality with forming accurate beliefs. But so does Jussim's critique.},
author = {Kahan, Dan M.},
doi = {10.1017/s0140525x15002332},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Kahan (2012).pdf:pdf},
issn = {0140-525X},
journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
title = {{The expressive rationality of inaccurate perceptions}},
volume = {40},
year = {2017}
}
@article{Schwarz2007,
abstract = {This chapter draws attention to the role of metacognitive experiences in judgment and decision making and explores their implications for debiasing strategies and public information campaigns. It is organized as follows. The first section introduces key metacognitive experiences and summarizes their principles of operation. The second section addresses a core assumption of most debiasing techniques: If people only thought enough about the right inputs, they would arrive at a less biased judgment. We identify the conditions under which this assumption holds as well as the conditions under which this strategy backfires. The third section addresses public information campaigns and illuminates why attempts to discredit erroneous beliefs often achieve the opposite. Throughout, we identify open issues for future research and the chapter concludes with a discussion of theoretical and applied implications.},
author = {Schwarz, Norbert and Sanna, Lawrence J. and Skurnik, Ian and Yoon, Carolyn},
doi = {10.1016/S0065-2601(06)39003-X},
isbn = {0120152398},
issn = {00652601},
journal = {Advances in Experimental Social Psychology},
number = {06},
pages = {127--161},
title = {{Metacognitive Experiences and the Intricacies of Setting People Straight: Implications for Debiasing and Public Information Campaigns}},
volume = {39},
year = {2007}
}
@article{Carretal2014,
author = {Carr, D. Jasun and Barnidge, Matthew and Lee, Byung Gu and Tsang, Stephanie Jean},
doi = {10.1177/1077699014538828},
journal = {Journalism {\&} Mass Communication Quarterly},
keywords = {S,and sites devoted to,citizen journalism,e,g,logging services,media credibility,media skepticism,microb-,political cynicism,technologies such as blogs,twitter and vine,user-generated video,with the advent of,wordpress and tumblr},
mendeley-tags = {S},
number = {3},
title = {{Cynics and Skeptics: Evaluating the Credibility of Mainstream and Citizen Journalism}},
volume = {9},
year = {2014}
}
@article{Stroembaecketal2020,
abstract = {In contemporary high-choice media environments, the issue of media trust and its impact on people's media use has taken on new importance. At the same time, the extent to which people trust the news media and how much it matters for their use of different types of media is not clear. To lay the groundwork for future research, in this article we offer a focused review of (a) how news media trust has been conceptualized and operationalized in previous research and (b) research on the extent to which news media trust influences media use, and (c) offer a theoretically derived framework for future research on news media trust and its influence on media use.},
author = {Str{\"{o}}mb{\"{a}}ck, Jesper and Tsfati, Yariv and Boomgaarden, Hajo and Damstra, Alyt and Lindgren, Elina and Vliegenthart, Rens and Lindholm, Torun},
doi = {10.1080/23808985.2020.1755338},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Str{\"{o}}mb{\"{a}}cketal2020.pdf:pdf},
issn = {2380-8985},
journal = {Annals of the International Communication Association},
keywords = {News media trust,conceptualizations,measurements,methodology,news media use,selective exposure},
number = {0},
pages = {1--18},
publisher = {Taylor {\&} Francis},
title = {{News media trust and its impact on media use: toward a framework for future research}},
volume = {0},
year = {2020}
}
@article{Woon2017,
abstract = {Does the mass public have the ability to judge when politicians lie to them? Can citizens accurately judge the veracity of what politicians say, discerning true from false statements? In short, does the truth matter? I elicit truth perceptions in a novel statement rating task, asking respondents to judge the veracity of real statements from politicians, and I experimentally investigate how the availability of source cues a↵ect these perceptions. Comparing perceptions to the evaluations of an independent, fact-checking organization, I find that perceptions track the truth. While source cues increase polarization, they do not substantially diminish this relationship, except in the case of highly polarizing speakers. Overall, the results suggest that political lie detection is possible through the aggregation of individual perceptions, even in the face of formidable partisan forces.},
author = {Woon, Jonathan},
title = {{Political Lie Detection}},
year = {2017}
}
@article{Kahanetal2010,
author = {Kahan, Dan M. and Braman, Donald and Cohen, Geoffrey L. and Gastil, John and Slovic, Paul},
doi = {10.1007/s 10979-009-920 1-0},
journal = {Law and Human Behaviour},
number = {6},
pages = {501--516},
title = {{Who Fears the HPV Vaccine, Who Doesn't, and Why? An Experimental Study of the Mechanisms of Cultural Cognition}},
volume = {34},
year = {2010}
}
@inproceedings{Conoveretal2011,
author = {Conover, M. D. and Ratkiewicz, J and Francisco, M and Goncalves, B and Flammini, A and Menczer, F},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Fifth International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media Political},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Conover et al. - 2011 - Political Polarization on Twitter.pdf:pdf},
pages = {89--96},
title = {{Political Polarization on Twitter}},
year = {2011}
}
@article{Gainesetal2007,
author = {Gaines, Brian J and Kuklinski, James H and Quirk, Paul J and Peyton, Buddy},
doi = {10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00601.x},
journal = {The Journal of Politics},
keywords = {Beliefs,Motivated reasoning,Opinions,Panel survey},
mendeley-tags = {Beliefs,Motivated reasoning,Opinions,Panel survey},
number = {4},
pages = {957--974},
title = {{Same Facts, Different Interpretations: Partisan Motivation and Opinion on Iraq}},
volume = {69},
year = {2007}
}
@article{Bartels2002,
author = {Bartels, Larry M.},
journal = {Political Behavior},
number = {2},
pages = {117--150},
title = {{Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions}},
volume = {24},
year = {2002}
}
@article{HovlandWeiss1951,
author = {Hovland, Carl Iver and Weiss, Walter},
doi = {10.1086/266350},
journal = {The Public Opinion Quarterly},
number = {4},
pages = {635--650},
title = {{The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness}},
volume = {15},
year = {1951}
}
@book{Zaller1992,
address = {Cambridge},
author = {Zaller, John},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Zaller - 1992 - The nature and origins of mass opinion.docx:docx},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
title = {{The nature and origins of mass opinion}},
year = {1992}
}
@article{Sunsteinetal2017,
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
arxivId = {arXiv:1011.1669v3},
author = {Sunstein, Cass and Bobadilla-Suarez, Sebastian and Lazzaro, Stephanie and Sharot, Tali},
doi = {10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004},
eprint = {arXiv:1011.1669v3},
isbn = {9788578110796},
issn = {1098-6596},
journal = {Cornell Law Review},
pages = {1431--1444},
pmid = {25246403},
title = {{How people update beliefs about climage change}},
volume = {102},
year = {2017}
}
@article{Jones2019,
abstract = {A long line of research shows that voters frequently evaluate objective conditions through a perceptual screen, seeing a stronger economy and more peaceful world when their party is in power. We know less about how and why these partisan perceptual differences have changed over recent history, however. This paper combines ANES measures of retrospective evaluations from 1956 to 2016 and shows that partisan differences (1) have increased significantly over the past few decades across all types of assessments; (2) are greatest, and have changed the most, amongst the most politically aware; and (3) closely track changes in elite polarization over this time period. The extent of partisan disagreement in retrospective evaluations is thus not constant, but rather contingent on attributes of the voter and the political context. Greater political awareness and more polarized politicians result in larger partisan perceptual differences, as the most engaged citizens are the most likely to receive and internalize cues about the state of the world from their party's elites.},
author = {Jones, Philip Edward},
doi = {10.1007/s11109-019-09543-y},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Jones (2019).pdf:pdf},
isbn = {1110901909},
issn = {01909320},
journal = {Political Behavior},
keywords = {Partisanship,Political awareness,Retrospective evaluations},
publisher = {Springer US},
title = {{Partisanship, Political Awareness, and Retrospective Evaluations, 1956–2016}},
year = {2019}
}
@unpublished{EckerAng2017,
author = {Ecker, Ullrich K. H. and Ang, Li Chang},
doi = {10.17605/OSF.IO/48TCP},
title = {{Political Attitudes and the Processing of Misinformation Corrections}},
volume = {742},
year = {2017}
}
@article{Kahanetal2012,
author = {Kahan, Dan M. and Peters, Ellen and Wittlin, Maggie and Slovic, Paul and Ouellette, Lisa Larrimore and Braman, Donald and Mandel, Gregory},
doi = {10.1038/nclimate1547},
issn = {1758-678X},
journal = {Nature Climate Change},
keywords = {Identity protection,Misbeliefs,Motivated reasoning,Polarization},
mendeley-tags = {Identity protection,Misbeliefs,Motivated reasoning,Polarization},
month = {oct},
pages = {732--735},
publisher = {Nature Publishing Group},
title = {{The polarizing impact of science literacy and numeracy on perceived climate change risks}},
volume = {2},
year = {2012}
}
@article{Dekeersmaecker2017,
abstract = {The present experiment (N = 390) examined how people adjust their judgment after they learn that crucial information on which their initial evaluation was based is incorrect. In line with our expectations, the results showed that people generally do adjust their attitudes, but the degree to which they correct their assessment depends on their cognitive ability. In particular, individuals with lower levels of cognitive ability adjusted their attitudes to a lesser extent than individuals with higher levels of cognitive ability. Moreover, for those with lower levels of cognitive ability, even after the explicit disconfirmation of the false information, adjusted attitudes remained biased and significantly different from the attitudes of the control group who was never exposed to the incorrect information. In contrast, the adjusted attitudes of those with higher levels of cognitive ability were similar to those of the control group. Controlling for need for closure and right-wing authoritarianism did not influence the relationship between cognitive ability and attitude adjustment. The present results indicate that, even in optimal circumstances, the initial influence of incorrect information cannot simply be undone by pointing out that this information was incorrect, especially in people with relatively lower cognitive ability.},
author = {De keersmaecker, Jonas and Roets, Arne},
doi = {10.1016/j.intell.2017.10.005},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/DeKeersmaeckerRoets2017.pdf:pdf},
issn = {01602896},
journal = {Intelligence},
keywords = {Attitude change,Cognitive ability,Cognitive bias,Fake news,Human judgment,Intelligence},
number = {November},
pages = {107--110},
publisher = {Elsevier},
title = {{‘Fake news': Incorrect, but hard to correct. The role of cognitive ability on the impact of false information on social impressions}},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2017.10.005},
volume = {65},
year = {2017}
}
@article{PennycookRand2019b,
abstract = {Inaccurate beliefs pose a threat to democracy and fake news represents a particularly egregious and direct avenue by which inaccurate beliefs have been propagated via social media. Here we investigate the cognitive psychological profile of individuals who fall prey to fake news. We find a consistent positive correlation between the propensity to think analytically – as measured by the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) – and the ability to differentiate fake news from real news (“media truth discernment”). This was true regardless of whether the article's source was indicated (which, surprisingly, also had no main effect on accuracy judgments). Contrary to the motivated reasoning account, CRT was just as positively correlated with media truth discernment, if not more so, for headlines that aligned with individuals' political ideology. The link between analytic thinking and media truth discernment was driven both by a negative correlation between CRT and perceptions of fake news accuracy (particularly among Hillary Clinton supporters), and a positive correlation between CRT and perceptions of real news accuracy (particularly among Donald Trump supporters). This suggests that factors that undermine the legitimacy of traditional news media may exacerbate the problem of inaccurate political beliefs among Trump supporters, who engaged in less analytic thinking and were overall less able to discern fake from real news (regardless of the news' political valence). We also found consistent evidence that pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity negatively correlates with perceptions of fake news accuracy; a correlation that is mediated by analytic thinking. Finally, analytic thinking was associated with an unwillingness to share both fake and real news on social media. Our results indicate that the propensity to think analytically plays an important role in the recognition of misinformation, regardless of political valence – a finding that opens up potential avenues for fighting fake news.},
author = {Pennycook, Gordon and Rand, David G.},
journal = {Journal of Personality},
keywords = {analytic thinking,cognitive reflection test,dual process theory,fake news,intuition,news media,social media},
pages = {1--16},
title = {{Who falls for fake news? The roles of bullshit receptivity, overclaiming, familiarity, and analytic thinking}},
url = {https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract{\_}id=3023545},
year = {2019}
}
@unpublished{Ribeiro2017,
archivePrefix = {arXiv},
arxivId = {arXiv:1706.05924v1},
author = {Ribeiro, Manoel Horta and Calais, Pedro H and Almeida, A F and Jr, Wagner Meira},
doi = {10.475/123},
eprint = {arXiv:1706.05924v1},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Ribeiro et al. - 2017 - ”Everything I Disagree With is {\#} FakeNews ” Correlating Political Polarization and Spread of Misinformation.pdf:pdf},
isbn = {1234567245},
keywords = {acm reference format,calais,fake news,lter bubbles,manoel horta ribeiro,misinformation,opinion polarization,pedro h,virg},
title = {{”Everything I Disagree With is {\#} FakeNews ”: Correlating Political Polarization and Spread of Misinformation}},
year = {2017}
}
@article{Jostetal2003,
abstract = {Analyzing political conservatism as motivated social cognition integrates theories of personality (authoritarianism, dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity), epistemic and existential needs (for closure, regulatory focus, terror management), and ideological rationalization (social dominance, system justification). A meta-analysis (88 samples, 12 countries, 22,818 cases) confirms that several psychological variables predict political conservatism: death anxiety (weighted mean r = .50); system instability (.47); dogmatism-intolerance of ambiguity (.34); openness to experience (-.32); uncertainty tolerance (-.27); needs for order, structure, and closure (.26); integrative complexity (-.20); fear of threat and loss (.18); and self-esteem (-.09). The core ideology of conservatism stresses resistance to change and justification of inequality and is motivated by needs that vary situationally and dispositionally to manage uncertainty and threat.},
author = {Jost, John T. and Glaser, Jack and Kruglanski, Arie W. and Sulloway, Frank J.},
doi = {10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.339},
isbn = {0033-2909$\backslash$r1939-1455},
issn = {1939-1455},
journal = {Psychological Bulletin},
keywords = {conservatism,liberalism,motivated cognition,motivated reasoning,social cognition},
mendeley-tags = {conservatism,liberalism,motivated cognition,motivated reasoning,social cognition},
number = {3},
pages = {339--375},
pmid = {12784934},
title = {{Political conservatism as motivated social cognition.}},
url = {http://doi.apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi=10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.339},
volume = {129},
year = {2003}
}
@incollection{Swire2017,
author = {Swire, Briony and Ecker, Ullrich},
booktitle = {Misinformation and Mass},
editor = {Southwell, B. and Thorson, E. A. and Sheble, L.},
pages = {1--25},
title = {{Misinformation and its Correction: Cognitive Mechanisms and Recommendations for Mass Communication}},
year = {2017}
}
@article{Samuel-Azran2019,
abstract = {{\textless}p{\textgreater}In this paper, we wish to examine the perceived credibility of news items shared through Social Networking Sites (SNS) – specifically, as a function of tie strength and perceived credibility of the media source from which the content originated. We utilized a between-subjects design. The Facebook account of each participant (N=217) was analyzed. Based on this analysis, our participants were shown a fictitious Facebook post that was presumably shared by one of their Facebook friends with whom they had either a strong social tie (experiment group), or a weak social tie (control group). All recipients were then asked about their perceptions regarding the news source (from which the item presumably originated), and their perception regarding the credibility of the presented item. Our findings indicate that the strength of the social tie between the sharer of the item and its recipient mediates the effect of the credibility perception regarding the news source, and the perceived item credibility, as well as the likelihood of searching for additional information regarding the topic presented in the shared item.{\textless}/p{\textgreater}},
author = {Samuel-Azran, Tal and Hayat, Tsahi},
doi = {10.3916/C60-2019-07},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Samuel-Azran {\&} Hayat (2019).pdf:pdf},
issn = {1134-3478},
journal = {Comunicar},
keywords = {Credibility, social networking sites, social netwo},
number = {60},
title = {{Online news recommendations credibility: The tie is mightier than the source}},
url = {https://www.revistacomunicar.com/index.php?contenido=preimpreso{\&}doi=10.3916/C60-2019-07},
volume = {27},
year = {2019}
}
@techreport{ARDInfratest2017a,
author = {{ARD/Infratest Dimap}},
institution = {ARD/Infratest Dimap},
title = {{ARD DeutschlandTREND Januar 2017}},
url = {https://www.infratest-dimap.de/fileadmin/user{\_}upload/dt1701{\_}bericht.pdf},
year = {2017}
}
@unpublished{Barbera2018,
author = {Barber{\'{a}}, Pablo},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Barbera (2018).pdf:pdf},
pages = {1--5},
title = {{Explaining the Spread of Misinformation on Social Media: Evidence from the 2016 U . S . Presidential Election. Fake news on Twitter during the 2016 U . S . Presidential Election Campaign}},
year = {2018}
}
@book{Althaus2003,
address = {Cambridge},
author = {Althaus, Scott L.},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
title = {{Collective preferences in democratic politics: Opinion surveys and the will of the people}},
year = {2003}
}
@article{Pennycooketal2018,
author = {Pennycook, Gordon and Cannon, Tyrone D. and Rand, David G.},
journal = {Journal of Experimental Psychology: General},
number = {12},
pages = {1865--1880},
title = {{Prior exposure increases perceived accuracy of fake news}},
volume = {147},
year = {2018}
}
@article{Greer2003,
author = {Greer, Jennifer D.},
doi = {10.1207/S15327825MCS0601},
journal = {Mass Communication and Society},
keywords = {Advertising,Experiment,Source credibility},
mendeley-tags = {Advertising,Experiment,Source credibility},
number = {1},
pages = {11--28},
title = {{Evaluating the Credibility of Online Information: A Test of Source and Advertising Influence}},
volume = {6},
year = {2003}
}
@article{KohringMatthes2007,
author = {Kohring, Matthias and Matthes, J{\"{o}}rg},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Kohring {\&} Matthes (2007).pdf:pdf},
journal = {Communication Quarterly},
number = {2},
pages = {231--252},
title = {{Trust in News Media. Development and Validation of a Multidimensional Scale}},
volume = {34},
year = {2007}
}
@incollection{KuklinskiQuirk2000,
address = {Cambridge},
author = {Kuklinski, James H. and Quirk, Paul J},
booktitle = {Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the Bounds of Rationality},
editor = {McCubbins, Mathew D. and Lupia, Arthur and Popkin, Samuel L.},
keywords = {Bias,Heuristics,Opinions},
mendeley-tags = {Bias,Heuristics,Opinions},
pages = {153--182},
title = {{Reconsidering the Rational Public: Cognition, Heuristics, and Mass Opinion}},
year = {2000}
}
@article{Althaus1998,
abstract = {Contruly to much of the literature on collective opinion, I find that the low levels and uneven social distribution ofpolitical knowledge in the mass public often cause opinion surveys to misrepresent the mix of voices in a society. To assess the bias introduced by information effects, I compare 'ffully informed" collective preferences simulated from actual survey data to collective preferences revealed in the original data. Analysis of policy questions from the 1988 and 1992 American National Election Studies shows that group differences in knowledge, along with the public's modest average level of political knowledge, can cause signijicant distortions in measures of collective opinion. The mass public may appear more progressive on some issues and more conservative on others than would be the case if all citizens were equally well informed. To the extent that opinion polls influence democratic politics, this suggests that information effects can impair the responsiveness of governments to their citizens.},
author = {Althaus, Scott L.},
doi = {10.2307/2585480},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Althaus (1998).pdf:pdf},
isbn = {0003-0554},
issn = {00030554},
journal = {The American Political Science Review},
number = {3},
pages = {545--558},
title = {{Information Effects in Collective Information Effects Preferences}},
volume = {92},
year = {1998}
}
@article{MacCoun1998,
abstract = {The latter half of this century has seen an erosion in the perceived legitimacy of science as an impartial means of finding truth. Many research topics are the subject of highly politicized dispute; indeed, the objectivity of the entire discipline of psychology has been called into question. This essay examines attempts to use science to study science: specifically, bias in the interpretation and use of empirical research findings. I examine theory and research on a range of cognitive and motivational mechanisms for bias. Interestingly, not all biases are normatively proscribed; biased interpretations are defensible under some conditions, so long as those conditions are made explicit. I consider a variety of potentially corrective mechanisms, evaluate prospects for collective rationality, and compare inquisitorial and adversarial models of science.},
author = {MacCoun, Robert J.},
doi = {10.1146/annurev.psych.49.1.259},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/MacCoun (1998).pdf:pdf},
issn = {0066-4308},
journal = {Annual Review of Psychology},
keywords = {advocacy,ideology,judgment,methodology,politics,values},
number = {1},
pages = {259--287},
title = {{Biases in the interpretation and use of research results}},
volume = {49},
year = {1998}
}
@article{Brydges2018,
abstract = {Misinformation often affects inferences and judgments even after it has been retracted and discredited. This is known as the continued influence effect. Memory processes have been theorized to contribute to the continued influence effect, and much previous research has focussed on the role of long-term memory processes at the time misinformation is retrieved during inferential reasoning and judgments. Recently, however, experimental research has focussed upon the role of working memory (WM) processes engaged in the updating and integration of information, when the retraction is encoded. From an individual differences perspective, susceptibility to continued influence effects should be predicted by a person's WM abilities, if continued reliance on misinformation is influenced, at least in part, by insufficient integration of the initial misinformation and its subsequent retraction. Consequently, we hypothesized that WM capacity would predict susceptibility to continued influence effects uniquely and more substantially than short-term memory (STM) capacity. Participants (N = 216) completed a continued-influence task, as well as a battery of WM and STM capacity tasks. Based on a latent variable model, our hypothesis was supported (WM capacity: $\beta$ = −0.36, p =.013; STM capacity: $\beta$ = 0.22, p =.187). Consequently, we suggest that low WM capacity is a measurable “risk factor” for continued reliance on misinformation.},
author = {Brydges, Christopher R. and Gignac, Gilles E. and Ecker, Ullrich K.H.},
doi = {10.1016/j.intell.2018.03.009},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Brydgesetal2018.pdf:pdf},
issn = {01602896},
journal = {Intelligence},
keywords = {Continued influence effect,Individual differences,Short-term memory,Working memory},
number = {June},
pages = {117--122},
publisher = {Elsevier},
title = {{Working memory capacity, short-term memory capacity, and the continued influence effect: A latent-variable analysis}},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2018.03.009},
volume = {69},
year = {2018}
}
@book{PettyCacioppo1986,
address = {New York, NY},
author = {Petty, Richard E. and Cacioppo, John T.},
doi = {10.1007/978-1-4612-4964-1},
publisher = {Springer},
title = {{Communication and Persuasion. Central and Peripheral Routes to Attitude Change}},
year = {1986}
}
@article{Aronsonetal1963,
author = {Aronson, Elliot and Turner, Judith A. and Carlsmith, J. Merrill},
doi = {10.1037/h0045513},
journal = {The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology},
number = {1},
pages = {31--36},
title = {{Communicator credibility and communication discrepancy as determinants of opinion change}},
volume = {67},
year = {1963}
}
@article{Ryffel2014,
abstract = {This study examined the influence of an emotionally arousing writing style on attitude formation and change. It has been proposed that different writing styles induce attitudes based on either affect or cognition and with either high or low certainty. Previous work indicates that the interplay of these attitude characteristics determines the persuasiveness of emotional and rational media appeals. To test the hypotheses, participants in an experimental study read articles from a magazine about a fictitious attitude object. In the first step, 4 different types of attitudes varying in base and level of certainty were induced through a respectively manipulated article. In the second step, these attitudes were challenged by an additional article, which presented either an emotional or rational persuasive appeal. The results supported hypotheses on attitude induction through media stimuli and 3 of 4 hypotheses regarding the persuasiveness of emotionally and rationally written articles.},
author = {Ryffel, Fabian Alexander and Wirz, Dominique Stefanie and K{\"{u}}hne, Rinaldo and Wirth, Werner},
doi = {10.1080/15213269.2014.933850},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Library/Application Support/Mendeley Desktop/Downloaded/Ryffel et al. - 2014 - How Emotional Media Reports Influence Attitude Formation and Change The Interplay of Attitude Base, Attitude Cert.pdf:pdf},
issn = {1521-3269},
journal = {Media Psychology},
keywords = {Emotionality,Opinions,Persuasion},
mendeley-tags = {Emotionality,Opinions,Persuasion},
number = {May 2017},
pages = {397--419},
title = {{How Emotional Media Reports Influence Attitude Formation and Change: The Interplay of Attitude Base, Attitude Certainty, and Persuasion}},
url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15213269.2014.933850},
volume = {17},
year = {2014}
}
@article{Metzger2010,
abstract = {The tremendous amount of information available online has resulted in considerable research on information and source credibility. The vast majority of scholars, however, assume that individuals work in isolation to form credibility opinions and that people must assess information credibility in an effortful and time-consuming manner. Focus group data from 109 participants were used to examine these assumptions. Results show thatmost users rely on others to make credibility assessments, often through the use of group-based tools. Results also indicate that rather than systematically processing information, participants routinely invoked cognitive heuristics to evaluate the credibility of information and sources online. These findings are leveraged to suggest a number of avenues for further credibility theorizing, research, and practice},
author = {Metzger, Miriam J. and Flanagin, Andrew J. and Medders, Ryan B.},
doi = {10.1111/j.1460-2466.2010.01488.x},
isbn = {0021-9916$\backslash$n1460-2466},
issn = {00219916},
journal = {Journal of Communication},
keywords = {Source credibility},
mendeley-tags = {Source credibility},
number = {3},
pages = {413--439},
title = {{Social and heuristic approaches to credibility evaluation online}},
volume = {60},
year = {2010}
}
@techreport{Bundeswahlleiter2017,
author = {Bundeswahlleiter},
title = {{Bundestagswahl 2017}},
year = {2017}
}
@article{Dittoetal2018a,
abstract = {One form of partisan bias is the tendency to more readily accept the validity of information that affirms one's political beliefs than information that challenges those beliefs. Both liberals and conservatives accuse their political opponents of partisan bias, but is there empirical evidence that one side of the political aisle is indeed more biased than the other? To address this question, we meta-analyzed the results of 41 experimental studies of partisan bias involving over 12,000 participants who identified their political ideology. Based on previous literature, two hypotheses were tested: an asymmetry hypothesis (predicting greater partisan bias in conservatives than liberals) and a symmetry hypothesis (predicting equal levels of partisan bias in liberals and conservatives). Overall partisan bias was robust (r = .254) and there was strong support for the symmetry hypothesis: liberals (r = .248) and conservatives (r = .247) showed nearly identical levels of bias across studies. Several methodological features moderated the degree of overall bias, and the relative magnitude of bias in liberals and conservatives differed across political topics. Implications of the current findings for the ongoing ideological symmetry debate, and partisan bias' role in scientific discourse and political conflict are discussed.},
author = {Ditto, Peter H. and Liu, Brittany S. and Clark, Cory J. and Wojcik, Sean P. and Chen, Eric E. and Grady, Rebecca H. and Celniker, Jared B. and Zinger, Joanne F.},
doi = {10.1177/1745691617746796},
eprint = {/doi.org/10.1007/s10551- 015-2769-z.For},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Downloads/Ditto et al. (2018).pdf:pdf},
isbn = {1055101527},
issn = {17456924},
journal = {Perspectives on Psychological Science},
keywords = {bias,ideology,meta-analysis,motivated reasoning,politics},
pmid = {29851554},
primaryClass = {https:},
title = {{At Least Bias Is Bipartisan: A Meta-Analytic Comparison of Partisan Bias in Liberals and Conservatives}},
year = {2018}
}
@article{Laymanetal2014,
author = {Layman, Geoffrey C. and Green, John C. and Kalkan, Kerem Ozan},
file = {:Users/bernhardclemm/Dropbox/PhD/Literatur/Laymann et al (2014).pdf:pdf},
journal = {Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion},
keywords = {american public opinion,barack obama,muslims},
number = {3},
pages = {534--555},
title = {{A Muslim President ? Misperceptions of Barack Obama's Faith in the 2008 Presidential Campaign}},
volume = {53},