EternalSafety is a Zeek package for detecting potentially-dangerous SMBv1 protocol violations that encapsulate bugs exploited by the infamous Eternal* family of Windows exploits. It is capable of detecting EternalBlue, EternalSynergy/EternalRomance, EternalChampion, and the DoublePulsar backdoor. However, rather than identifying these exploits via simple signature-matching, EternalSafety instead implements a set of SMBv1 protocol invariants that encapsulate techniques used by each Eternal* exploit to trigger bugs in unpatched Windows systems.
EternalSafety accurately and reliably identifies the EternalBlue, EternalSynergy and EternalRomance exploits, and the DoublePulsar backdoor implant. Due to limitations in Zeek's SMBv1 support, it has limited support for detecting EternalChampion via signature-matching. EternalSafety also identifies a range of other protocol violations, such as the use of unimplemented/unused SMBv1 commands, server-initiated changes in values that may only be set by an SMBv1 client, and incorrect interleaving of transaction types.
The key idea behind this package comes from an observation that in order to trigger bugs that leak memory, overflow buffers, rewrite function pointers, etc., all of the Eternal* exploits are forced to violate parts of the SMBv1 protocol specification.
Unlike existing detections for the Eternal* exploits, EternalSafety does NOT take a solely signature-based approach. Instead, it implements a superset of more general invariants selected from the SMBv1 protocol specification. This is a powerful distinction: in addition to detecting the known Eternal* exploits, EternalSafety may also be able to detect the use of new, yet-to-be-identified SMBv1 zero-day exploits on a network.
The initial set of invariants implemented in EternalSafety are supersets of the specific violations utilized by the Eternal* exploits, and were selected due to their potential for triggering SMB sever bugs like race conditions, memory leaks, and buffer overruns. In future, it would be possible to implement an even broader set of invariants encompassing more of the SMBv1 specification, and even to expand this to SMBv2.
Note that although the bugs exploited by the Eternal* exploits have been patched, EternalSafety still serves a clear purpose. A huge number of unpatched machines remain in use in networks around the world, and this family of exploits remains in widespread use by malicious actors and malware. It is also still common for organizations to run older versions of Windows to support legacy applications. Additionally, there may be other as-of-yet undiscovered SMBv1 bugs in Windows systems, whose exploitation EternalSafety may be able to detect.
This package can be installed through the Zeek package manager:
zkg refresh
zkg install 0xl3x1/zeek-EternalSafety
This package raises the following notices:
Indication of a possible EternalBlue or other buffer exploit attempt by an SMBv1 client. This notice is triggered if an SMBv1 client sends an SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2_SECONDARY request interleaved with an SMB_COM_NT_TRANSACT transaction type.
Indication of dangerous behaviour and a possible EternalSynergy or EternalRomance exploit attempt by an SMBv1 client. This notice is triggered if an SMBv1 client sends an SMB_COM_WRITE_ANDX command interleaved with the execution of any different transaction type.
Note that this is a superset of the specific violation caused by EternalSynergy, which specifically interleaves SMB_COM_WRITE_ANDX with an SMB_COM_TRANSACTION and SMB_COM_TRANSACTION_SECONDARY.
Indication of a possible EternalSynergy exploit attempt by an SMBv1 client. This notice is triggered by a signature that matches a single packet containing two SMB commands: an SMB_COM_NT_TRANSACT with the unimplemented NT_TRANSACT_RENAME subcommand, followed immediately by an SMB_COM_NT_TRANSACT_SECONDARY command.
NOTE: due to limitations in Zeek's SMBv1 protocol support, this notice is triggered by a signature, and hence may not trigger reliably (for instance, if a matching packet is out of range of the region of the TCP stream that Zeek is configured to match against).
See: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2017/06/29/eternal-champion-exploit-analysis/
Indication of a possible DoublePulsar backdoor implant on an SMBv1 server.
This notice is triggered when an SMBv1 server changes the MID SMBv1 header
field value mid-transaction (a violation of the SMBv1 protocol specification),
AND the new value is in the range 81 <= MID < 84.
DoublePulsar uses the value of MID as a covert channel for receiving commands
and sending back status codes, and sends back a status code of 81 or 82 to
indicate successful installation. Note that even if the value sent back
differs, any use of MID as a communication channel would still be detected by
the superset notice EternalSafety::ViolationPidMid.
Indication of a misbehaving, and possibly-compromised SMBv1 server. This notice
is a superset of EternalSafety::DoublePulsar, and is triggered whenever an
SMBv1 server introduces a new MID (multiplex identifier) or PID (process
identifier) value in the SMBv1 header. This is a violation of the SMBv1
protocol, and may indicate the use of a covert channel or some other buggy or
malicious misbehaviour.
Indication of a misbehaving, possibly malicious SMBv1 client. This notice is triggered when an SBMv1 client sends a request containing any unused or unimplemented primary SMB command. This is a violation of the SMBv1 protocol, and could indicate an exploit attempt (e.g. trying to trigger a maliciously injected command handler).
According to the SMBv1 protocol specification:
If a code or code range is marked Unused, it is undefined and reserved for future use. If a code or code range is marked Reserved, it is or was reserved for a specific purpose. Both of these indicate that client implementations SHOULD NOT send messages using any of those command codes.
Indication of a misbehaving, possibly malicious SMBv1 client. This notice is triggered when an SBMv1 client sends an SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2 request containing any unimplemented transaction subcommand. This is a violation of the SMBv1 protocol, and could indicate an exploit attempt (e.g. trying to trigger a maliciously injected command handler).
According to the SMBv1 protocol specification, for each of the unimplemented transaction subcommands:
Clients SHOULD NOT send requests using this command code.
Triggered by a signature that matches an SMB_COM_NT_TRANSACT command with the unimplemented subcommand NT_TRANSACT_RENAME. This is a superset of the EternalSafety::EternalChampion notice.
NOTE: due to limitations in Zeek's SMBv1 protocol support, this notice is triggered by a signature, and hence may not trigger reliably (for instance, if a matching packet is out of range of the region of the TCP stream that Zeek is configured to match against).
According to the SMBv1 specification for NT_TRANSACT_RENAME:
Clients SHOULD NOT send requests using this subcommand code.
Hence, use of this subcommand is automatically suspicious and may indicate a buggy client or malicious exploit attempt. This subcommand is used by several exploits to trigger execution of a malicious injected event handler.
See: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2017/06/29/eternal-champion-exploit-analysis/
This package is considered stable and is not being actively developed. However, bugfixes and other pull requests are welcomed, and will be reviewed on a best-effort basis.
Note that this package is deployed on a significant number of production Zeek instances, so please ensure that any changes have been thoroughly tested, including on live traffic if possible, and that all pull requests include good test coverage.